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Blur and perceptual content
BENCE NANAY
1. Introduction
Intentionalism about visual experiences is the view according to which the
phenomenal character of a visual experience supervenes on the content of this
experience.1 One of the most important counterexamples to intentionalism is
the following. Seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and seeing a sharp contour
blurrily have different phenomenal character but the same content (the ob-
jection was first raised by Boghossian and Velleman (1989)). Hence, the
phenomenal character of perceptual experience cannot supervene on the con-
tent of this experience as in this example two perceptual experiences have the
same content and yet they have different phenomenal character.
I argue that if we accept a simple and not particularly controversial way of
thinking about perceptual content, then we have no reason to suppose that
these two experiences have the same content. I then compare my proposal
about blur with Michael Tye’s seemingly similar account and point out that
they are in fact very different, so much so that my proposal can give adequate
answers to the two most important objections Tye’s account faces.
2. Blur and determinacy
Compare the following two experiences. First, I am looking at a fuzzy con-
tour, say, a blurry photograph and I see the photograph clearly. Second, I am
looking at a clear contour, but I see this contour blurrily (because I don’t
have my glasses on). The original objection to intentionalism was that these
two experiences have the same content but different phenomenal character.
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an uncontroversial assumption these days. See a series of papers by Craig French on how
one can talk about blurry vision in a naı¨ve realist framework (French 2014, 2015).
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Hence, the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences cannot supervene
on their content.
There are two ways of attacking this objection to intentionalism. One
would be to deny that the two experiences have different phenomenal char-
acter (see, e.g., Schroer 2002). I will not do this: disagreements about phe-
nomenology are notoriously difficult to settle, so those who want to defend
intentionalism are better off accepting for the sake of the argument that the
two experiences differ in their phenomenal character.
The other strategy is to deny that they have the same content. There are
many different ways of doing this (just a few: Allen 2013; Crane 2006;
Dretske 2003; Kelly 2010; Pautz 2010; Tye 2002, 2003), but regardless of
which of these versions we consider, the success of this general strategy
clearly depends on how we think about perceptual content.
In the next section, I outline a straightforward account of perceptual con-
tent. Then in Section 4, I argue that if we accept way of thinking about
perceptual content, blur poses no problem for intentionalism. In Section 5,
I contrast my account with Michael Tye’s.
3. Perceptual content
Consider the following, very simple, and not particularly controversial, way
of thinking about perceptual content (see, e.g., Kulvicki 2007; Nanay 2010,
2015a, 2015b). Our perceptual apparatus attributes various properties to
various parts of the perceived scene. Perceptual content is partly constituted
by the sum total of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.2 The
question is what kind of properties are being attributed to the perceived
scene.
One way of characterizing the relation between properties is the determin-
able-determinate relation (Funkhouser 2006; Johnston 1921). To use a clas-
sic example, being red is determinate of being coloured, but determinable of
being scarlet. There are many ways of being red and being scarlet is one of
these: for something to be scarlet is for it to be red, in a specific way. If
something is red, it also has to be of a certain specific shade of red: there
is no such thing as being red simpliciter.
The determinable-determinate relation is a relative one: the same property,
for example, of being red, can be the determinate of the determinable being
coloured, but the determinable of the determinate being scarlet. Thus, the
determinable-determinate relation gives us hierarchical ordering of properties
2 I say ‘partly constituted’ in order to deliver on my promise that this account of perceptual
content is not particularly controversial as it would allow for the potential role of the
particular these properties are attributed to as well as for the ‘mode of presentation’ of
these properties (if these are to be distinguished from the attributed properties).
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in a given property-space. Properties with no further determinates, if there
are any, are known as super-determinates.
Some of the properties we perceptually attribute to the perceived scene are
determinates or even super-determinates. Some others, on the other hand, are
determinable properties. We know that our peripheral vision is only capable
of attributing extremely determinable properties. But even some of the prop-
erties we perceptually attribute to the objects that are in our fovea can be
determinable.
It has been argued that this way of thinking about content (with the add-
itional assumption that perceptual attention makes the attended property
more determinate) helps us to explain away some other influential counter-
examples to intentionalism: ones that have to do, one way or another, with
attention (Nanay 2010, 2011; Stazicker 2011). My aim here is to show that if
we accept this, again, not particularly controversial, account of perceptual
content, then we have a simple way of handling the alleged counterexample
to intentionalism that blurry vision poses.
4. Blur and determinacy
Remember the two experiences that pose a problem for intentionalism: look-
ing at a blurry photograph clearly and looking at a clear contour blurrily. If
we accept the account of perceptual content I outlined in the last section, then
these two experiences do not have the same content. When I see a fuzzy
contour clearly, I attribute determinate (maybe superdeterminate) properties
to the fuzzy contour. When I see the sharp contour blurrily, in contrast, I
attribute determinable properties to the sharp contour. The content of these
two perceptual episodes are very different.
Let us proceed more slowly and consider the ways in which perceptual
states can represent the property of having a certain spatial location. A per-
ceptual state can attribute determinable or determinate property-instances of
having a spatial location. When I am looking at (and attending to) the space-
bar of my laptop right in front of me, my perceptual state attributes a highly
determinate (maybe even super-determinate) spatial location property to
this object. But on many other occasions (say, when I am too far away
from it or when I only catch a glimpse of it in the periphery of my visual
field), my perceptual state will attribute a determinable spatial location prop-
erty to this object: the property of approximately what spatial region it is
located in.
My claim is that the difference between seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and
seeing a sharp contour blurrily is a difference of this kind. When I see a fuzzy
contour clearly, my perceptual state attributes a specific, highly determinate
property to this contour. It may be blurry but I see it as being at a specific,
highly determinate spatial location. But when I see the sharp contour blurrily,
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my perceptual state attributes a determinable spatial location property to this
contour. I do not see this contour as being at a specific, highly determinate
spatial location. I see it as being at an approximate, determinable spatial
location: as being somewhere in the blurry-looking spatial region.
In short, the difference between the two experiences is a difference of the
determinacy of the spatial location properties perceptually attributed to the
scene. When I see the fuzzy contour clearly, these properties are determinates.
When I see the sharp contour blurrily, they are determinables. As perceptual
content is partly constituted by the sum total of the properties perceptually
attributed to the perceived scene, the perceptual content in the two scenarios
are clearly different. Hence, the fact that the two experiences have different
phenomenal character (if they do) does not constitute a counterexample to
intentionalism.
5. Determinacy versus ‘failure to comment’
Michael Tye proposed a seemingly similar explanation of how the phenom-
enon of blurry vision is consistent with intentionalism. I aim to point out that
my account is importantly different from Tye’s, so much so that it can give
adequate answers to the two most important objections to Tye’s explanatory
scheme.
According to Tye, ‘in seeing blurrily, one undergoes sensory representa-
tions that fail to specify just where the boundaries and contours lie. Some
information that was present with eyes focused is now missing’ (Tye 2002:
147–148). In short, ‘one’s visual experience . . . makes no comment on where
exactly the boundaries lie’ (Tye 2003: 18).
There are some similarities between my account and Tye’s inasmuch as
both deny that blurry vision attributes determinate properties. But there is a
crucial ambiguity in Tye’s account. Sometimes he seems to deny that any
properties are represented (if we interpret failure to comment to mean failure
to represent). But some other times, he seems to allow for some represented
properties, for example when he talks about ‘less definite information about
surface depth, orientation, contours, and so forth’ (Tye 2002: 80).
Sometimes, for example, when he says that ‘my visual experience is silent
on the precise locus (if any) of the edges’ (Tye 2003: 19), he seems to endorse
the first, no representation at all interpretation. The second quote in the
previous paragraph (from Tye 2003), in contrast, talks about failure to com-
ment on ‘where exactly the boundaries lie’ (my emphasis). This sounds more
similar to the view I defend.
My aim here is not a close analysis of Tye’s text. If his official view is that
blurry vision fails to comment on the exact boundaries, but does comment on
the approximate (that is, determinable) boundaries, then his view is compat-
ible with mine and my view could be thought of as an elaboration of his.
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If his official view is that blurry vision fails to comment on the boundaries at
all, exact or approximate (which seems to be the standard interpretation of
Tye’s view, see French 2014, 2015; Pace 2007; Smith 2008), then, I will
argue, my view is preferable to Tye’s. In fact, my account can easily
answer the two most important objections to Tye’s proposal (interpreted
as a proposal about failure to comment tout court).
The first objection to Tye’s proposal (again, interpreted as a proposal
about failure to comment tout court) is that according to Tye, the difference
between seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and seeing a sharp contour blurrily is
not a difference of what is represented but of what is not represented (Smith
2008: 206–207). Thus, strictly speaking, it is not a representational differ-
ence that the intentionalist would need in order to argue that phenomenal
character supervenes on perceptual content (see Pautz 2010 for a different
assessment of whether this explanation of blur is consistent with bona fide
intentionalism).
If we accept my proposal, then the difference between seeing a fuzzy con-
tour clearly and seeing a sharp contour blurrily is in fact a representational
difference: a difference of what properties are being attributed to the per-
ceived scene. In the former case, these perceptually attributed properties are
determinate, whereas in the latter case, they are determinable.
The second objection is that if we accept Tye’s analysis, seeing something
blurrily and seeing something in the periphery of one’s visual field would
have the same content: it is true of both experiences that they ‘fail to
comment on where exactly the boundaries lie’. But these two experiences
with the same content have different phenomenology. Hence, the original
objection can be now raised in the case of these two experiences: seeing a
sharp contour blurrily and seeing it in the periphery of one’s visual field.
They have the same content, but clearly different phenomenology, which
means that phenomenology does not supervene on perceptual content:
intentionalism is false (a version of this argument is given in Pace 2007:
334–335).
According to my proposal, there is a clear difference between the content
of these two experiences. When I see a sharp contour blurrily, the spatial
location property that is perceptually attributed to this contour is determin-
able. But, as long as I am attending to this contour, a number of other
properties that are also perceptually attributed to this contour, for example,
its colour property, will be determinate (or even super-determinate). In
the case of peripheral vision, in contrast, our perceptual system can only
attribute determinable properties to the objects seen in the periphery
of one’s visual field – not just determinable spatial location properties, but
determinable colour properties, shape properties, etc. Hence, we have a clear
representational difference between blurry vision and peripheral vision:
the former attributes determinable spatial location properties, but determin-
ate colour-, shape-, etc. properties, the latter attributes only determinable
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properties. The perceptual contents of these two perceptual episodes are very
different.
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If time travel to our location is possible, we do not
live in a branching universe
JAMES NORTON
This article argues for the following disjunction: either we do not live in a
world with a branching temporal structure, or backwards time travel1 is
nomologically impossible, given the initial state of the universe, or backwards
time travel to our space–time location is impossible, given large-scale facts
about space and time. A fortiori, if backwards time travel to our location is
possible, we do not live in a branching universe.
Horwich (1987: 1) gestures towards an interesting argument for the con-
clusion that there is no backwards time travel in the actual world. For, if
there is some future time, t, at which the requisite technology is developed
and subsequently used, we would expect to see, around here, time travellers
originating from t. We see no such time travellers, and thus there is no actual
time travel.2 Call this (following Smith 2016) the ‘where are the time travel-
lers?’ argument. Fulmer (1980) articulates, but declines to endorse, the same
style of argument. Reinganum (1986) argues in a similar vein that if there is
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1 When I talk of backwards time travel, I have in mind the interesting kind, where future
individuals can travel back and interact with past individuals.
2 ‘If the necessary technology will ever become available, why haven’t we encountered vis-
itors from the future?’ (1987: 1). In chapter 7 of the same volume, Horwich presents his
better-known argument against time travel: namely, that backwards time travel would
result in ‘an endless string of improbable coincidences’ (1987: 123). This latter argument
is given a thorough treatment in Smith 1997 and is not my focus here. Likewise, while
Hawking (1992: 610) notes that ‘[t]here is also strong experimental evidence in favor of
the conjecture [that there is no actual time travel] from the fact that we have not been
invaded by hordes of tourists from the future’, his primary argument – that there is no
actual time travel due to the nomological impossibility of closed time-like curves – is not
my focus.
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